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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANITA FLIPPEN, 
Plaintiff and AplJ!ellant, · 
. vs. C-ase No. 7551 
FAY MILLWARD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts 
set forth in appellant's brief, but is of the opinion th_at 
a few additional facts, not set forth therein, would be 
helpful. They relate to: (1) a more detailed descrip-
tion of the ,place of the accident as indicated by plain-
tiff's Exhibit ''A'', prepared by a witness, Franklin 
Charles Nielsen (R. 33), (2) the position of the auto-
mobiles at the time of the collision, (3) in regard to 
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Millward observing the Flippen 'automobile before the 
impact and (4) the conversation with Mr. Flippen as 
to whether the tail-light on his automobile was working. 
The point marked 16, Exhibit "A", is .. the north 
edge of the bridge or culvert (R. 35). The s:pace 
between 10 and 11, marked on Exhibit "A", is a 
12-foot dirt shoulder (R. 36). This shoulder. is a good 
solid shoulder and capable of being driven on with~ 
out any danger (R. 38). The distance from the north 
· edge of the bridge, number 16, to the double line at 
the center of the highway is something over 35 feet 
(R. 39). 
George E. Briggs testified he noticed glass on the 
pavement a little north of the intersection in the center 
of pavement -a little west of the yellow line (R. 105). 
Mr. Millward testified that at the time of the 
collision his left wheel was approximately 6 or 8 
inches from the center or yellow line. This was true 
after the impact (R. 111). His car stopped within 
probably a car length from the ~oint of impact and 
the Flippen car was in a straight line ahead of hiih 
(R. 112). He further testified that he came to an 
immediate stop -at the time of the collision; that he 
did not know whether he had applied his brakes just 
bef·ore or at the time, but that he did stop immedi-
ately. (R. 42). 
In connection with his conversation with Mr. 
Flippen, about two weeks after the accident, Millward 
testified that Flippen did state that possibly the t·ail-
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light didn't work (R. 115). Mr. Flippen, in relation 
to this conversation, stated that he was referring to 
the stop light and told him so at the time, that is, 
the light that goes on when you step on the brakes; 
that it pos-sibly didn't work (R. 119). Mr. Flippen also 
testified that the spare tire on his car was carried com-
pletely underneath the. back of the truck (R. 86). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. THERE IS EVIDENCE To SuPPORT INSTRUCTION No. 7. 
2. INSTRUCTION No. 7 IS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THERE rs EVIDENCE To SUPPORT INsTRUCTION No. 7. 
The entire argument of appellant is based ~tpon 
the statement that there was no eviden·ce of any sud-
den slowing down of the plaintiff's automobile. In 
making this statement, it is apparent to respondent 
that appellant has failed to take into consideration 
not only some of the oral testimony shown in the 
record and set forth in her brief, but has completely 
ignored the physical facts disclosed by the ~vidence. 
It is true that Mrs. Flippen testified that she was 
traveling around 8 to 10 miles per hour at the time 
of the im,•pact. This testimony, however, is in direct 
conflict with the testimony of three witnesses who testi-
fied that appellant's car came to rest 12 to 15 feet 
s,traight ahead of respondent's car. Mr. Ross Everett 
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Williams testified that after the ~collision plaintiff's 
·car was squarely in front of defendant's car down 
the highway about 10 or 12 feet (R. 94), and that 
they h·ad to push the truck off the road (R. 93). The 
witness, Floyd Dean Buckley, testified that after the 
collision the plaintiff's car was 12 or 14 feet in front 
of defendant's; that the defendant's car was directly 
behind plaintiff's (R. 101). And the respondent, Mill-
ward, testified th~at after the impact he walked over 
to the Flippen vehicle, which was 12 or 15 feet straight 
ahead of his car on the highway (R. 112). This 
physical fact ,could hardly have hap:pened, if Mrs. 
Flippen had been traveling 8 to 10 miles an hour, as 
she so testified, and then been struck in the rear by 
a car going at approximately the same speed. This 
is evidence that the car had ·been slowed down to 
-almost 'a stop or, in fact, had. stopp·ed upon the high-
way. There is the further testimony of Mr. Millward: 
''Q Now, can you describe the blow when 
you hit as .to whether you hit something like 
it was solid, still, or something moving~ 
"A It was very solid. * * * '' (R. 113). 
In addition to these statements of a physical fact, 
we have the testimony of Mrs. Fliwen herself that, 
as a precaution, so she would not hit the ditch, she 
put the ear in second gear just before the impact 
(R. 74, 75). This in and of itself would ·cause the car 
to reduce its speed considerably. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These facts, together 'vith the damage done to 
defendant's automobile, as shown by Exhibit "1", 
and the fact that the spare tire of the appellant, 
which was carried entirely underneath the truck, was 
embedded in the radiator grill of" defendant's car, 
clearly demonstrate that appellant mus.t have either 
suddenly slowed down or, in fact, stopped her auto-
mobile upon the highway. 
In many cases, physical facts are far more reli-
able than oral testimony. As stated in Moore on Facts, 
Weight· of Evidence, Volume 1, the following examples 
are g1ven: 
''Section 155. Physical Facts in Case of Col-
lision Between Vessels. - Given the position of 
a slowly moving schooner on the starboard of 
a steamer; given the facts that a half-laden 
steamer, readily and quickly obedient to her 
wheel, moving ten miles an hour, puts her helm 
hard down, and coming around strikes · the 
schooner with her port side-on these premises 
the conclusion was held to be irresistible that 
this steamer was in very close proximity to 
the schooner when she put her helm hard down; 
and this stubborn physical fact cannot be over-
come by testimony on the part of the vessel 
that she put her helm hard a-port several min-
utes before the collision.'' 
''Section 156. Stories of Violent Collision 
Without Physical Evidence Thereof. -· * * * It 
is 'simply incredible, against all common human 
experience, against all ,physical facts, that the 
end of a shaft attached to a buggy, drawn by 
a horse going at a full brisk trot, should 
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strike a woman in the left side with force suffi-
cient to throw her on ~a granite-paved street, 
and , with for~ce sufficient . . . to cause her 
death, and yet not leave on the body the slight-
est sign of violence. Such testimony should be 
disregarded by both courts and juries, and ne 
probative force should be given to it.' In a 
case where an electric car, going several miles 
per hour on a down grade, collided with a 
wagon, and the car stopped substantially at 
the point of the collision ~thout the persons 
on the car being materially disturbed or the 
car showing any evidetice of the occurrence 
other than a £ew scratches in the p-aint, and 
without the wagon being thrown forward upon 
the track or broken or marred at the place of 
contact, the court said that 'such circumstances 
so outweigh any amount of testimony, from 
the lips of witnesses, that the car was going 
many miles per hour :at or about the instant 
of the eollision, as to leave no room for such 
testimony to be true. ' '' 
From the physical facts, it could be properly inferred 
that appellant suddenly stopped or slowed down on 
the highway in front of the oncoming traffic, thus 
supporting Instruction No. 7. 
2. INSTRUCTION No. 7 IS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Counsel for appellant points out at page 21 of 
his brief that it is not error to give an erroneous 
instruction if an examination of all the evidence estab-
lishes that the one complaining of the error would 
not be entitled to prevail in any event. Had the 
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court instructed the jury as requested by the defend-
ant, and viewing all of the evidence, the court would 
not have given its Instruction No. 3 and, particularly, 
the folloWing 'Portion thereof: 
"I instruct you th·at driving into a motor 
vehicle on the highway before you see it is 
negligence as a matter of law, and in this case 
the defendant; Fay Millward, is guilty of negli-
gence which would preclude his recovery on his 
counterclaim and would entitle Anita. Flippen 
to recover her damages against him * * *. ' ' 
Taking into consideration the climatic conditio.ns 
at the time of this accident, we contend that the case 
falls entirely within the rule laid. down ·in the case 
of Trim·ble et ux. v. Union Pacific Stag-es et al., 105 
Utah 457, 142 Pac. (2d) 674, wherein the court stated: 
"Appellant argues that since defendant's bus 
was moving at such a speed after entering the 
fog that it could not be stopped within the 
driver's range of vision, the driver, and his 
principals, the defendants were guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law. Thus in effect ap-
pellants ask this court to say that one driving 
on a highway at night is bound to anticipate 
that there will be fog, smoke, or some other 
obstruction which will reduce the driver's 
vision, and that therefore all must drive at 
such S'peed that should they meet with such an 
obstruction they •can stop their automobile with-
in the range of their vision as it is limited by 
this obstruction. We do not believe this to be 
the correct rule of law, or the situation to 
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which the rule laid down in the Dalley case, 
supra, was intended to apply.'' 
The court refused Defendant's Requested Instruc-
tion No. 8, reading as follows: 
''You are instructed that the driver of a 
vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall 
both approach for a right turn and a right 
turn shall be made as close as practical to the 
right hand ·curve or edge of the roadway and, 
if you find from- the evidence in this case that 
plaintiff f~ailed to so do and that her failure to 
get as close as practical to the right hand 
edge of the roadway was the proximate cause 
of or contributed to her injuries and damage 
claimed, your verdict shall be in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff no cause 
of action. '' 
Had the court given proper instructions, then, 
under the evidence, the jury very well could have 
found that the defendant was not negligent. The jury 
could have further found that the plaintiff was negli-
gent in not approaching for the right turn as close 
as pr·actical to the 'right hand curve or edge of the 
roadway. This is true, particularly, when we take 
into consideration the nature of the highway, the 
density of the fog and the knowledge that plaintiff 
had of her course. She had been over the road n1any 
times, said that she could see thirty feet or more to 
the right and knew that there was travel coming dovvn 
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the high,vay in the dense fog. We think that any 
reasonably prudent person would have driven the 
vehicle clear to the right and even used the shoulder, 
which was solid and good to travel on. 
The jury could have further found Mrs. Flippen 
negligent in not having the tail-light on, though she 
claimed she had it on. The defendant said he never 
saw one, the men in the ear behind him never saw 
one and,- according to defendant's testimony, Mrs. 
Flippen told the defendant she had turned off her 
lights because she could see better in the fog without 
them. As heretofore pointed out, ~here is ample evi-
dence that the jury ·could find that appellant had either 
slowed down considerably or stopped on said highway. 
There is no question that she did not give a_ signal 
and Mr. Flippen testified that he thought his stop 
lights, which flash on and off when you p·ut on your 
brakes, were not working. 
The jury could not have been misled . by Instruc-
tion No. 7. They were instructed that they must find 
by a preponderance of the· evidence that ~laintiff 
suddenly decreased her speed without giving a proper 
signal. If there is no evidence to support this, why 
should the conclusion be drawn by counsel that the 
jury found that this happened merely because of the 
giving of the instruction~ If the court finds that there 
was no evidence to support this point, the error would 
not be reversible error, as indicated by the case of 
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Shafer v. ·Keeley Ice Cream Go., 65 Utah 46, 234 Pac. 
300, wherein the court, at page 304, stated_: 
''Error is assigned because of the giving by 
the court of instructions numbered 12 and 13. 
'' The effect of instruction No. 12 is that the 
law places upon pedestrians, who leave the side-
walk .and enter upon that portion of a street 
commonly used and intended for vehicles, the 
duty of con~inuous observation and care to 
protect themselves from injury. · The court had 
submitted to the jury the question whether 
plaintiff had suffer~d injury to the face or 
eye, by being hit with a piece of candy. thrown 
froin defendant's float, concerning which there 
had been some testimony. It is no doubt true 
that instruction No.· 12 was intended to have 
some bearing upon this particular question. 
Otherwise we · are unable to find any testimony 
in the record that called for that instruction 
or any like instruction. In any event, the giving 
of it did not constitute prejudicial error.'' 
Kuchenrneister v. Los Angeles ·& S. L. R. Co., 52 
Utah 116, 172 Pac. 725. In this ·case it is insisted that 
the court i!lcluded an element of damages in its charge 
with respect to which there was no evidence. The 
court held: 
"W;hile it is true, as a general rule, that it 
constitutes error to submit to a jury questions 
of fact or issues upon which there is no evi-
dence, yet it does not always follow that prej-
udice results from an erroneous charge of that 
~character. Where, as here, there is no claim nor 
evidence respecting plain tiff's earnings, it will 
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not be assumed that, in view of the ehatge of 
the court that the jury must be governed by the 
evidence, they did allow anything for past earn-
ings. This question was before the Supreme 
Court of Indiana in the case of Ohio & M. Ry. 
Co. ~. Stein, 140 Ind. 61, 39 N. E. 246, :and in 
Lytton v. Baird; 95 Ind. 349; in which cases it 
was held that ·such ~a charge, under the circum-
stances outlined above, cannot be held to ·be 
prejudicial.'' 
The case of Kelly v. Employers Casualty 'Co., 
(Okla.), 214 Pac. (2d) 925, cited by plaintiff, is diff-
_erent in every respect from the case :at bar. In that 
case there was an allegation oi contributory negli-
gence, the defense did not put on any evidence and 
plaintiff did not testify whether or not she did signal 
to slow down, while in the. case :at bar I> lain tiff testi-
fied that she gave a signal to turn, not one to slow 
down or stop ; in fact, she claims she never did slow 
down or stop, and from -such circumstances the jury 
could have come to the conclusion that she did not 
signal to slow down or stop. In the Oklahoma case, 
the court also held that the eourt gave an erroneous 
instruction concerning agency. This was due to the 
fact that agency was admitted by the pleadings of 
defendant, which were not verified. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant contends that there is no evidenee 
which would justify the giving of Instruction No. 7, 
and that the giving of the same was prejudicial error. 
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Taking the evidence as a whole, there is ample to 
'SUpport the ~ving of Instruction No. 7. In fact, the 
evidence would. have· justified the coiUrt in finding ap-
pellant guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
·of law. Therefore, we respectfully .submit that appel-
lant was not, in any event, prejudiced br the glving 
of Instruction No. 7, and that the verdict of the jury 
and judgment thereon should be :affirmed. 
Respectfully. submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
·and Respondent. 
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